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The Distinctiveness of Property and
Heritage
Derek Fincham*
This piece takes up the competing concepts of property and
heritage. Recent scholarship views property as a series of connections
and obligations-rather than the traditional power to control, transfer or
exclude. This new view of property may be safeguarding resources for
future generations, but also imposes onerous obligations based on
concerns over environmental protection, the protection of cultural
resources, group rights, and even rights to digital property. Yet these
obligations can also be imposed on subsequent generations, and certain
obligations are imposed now based on the actions of past generations.
This article examines the multigenerational aspects of property via a
body of law which should be called heritage law. Heritage law now
governs a wide range of activities some of which include: preventing
destruction of works of art, preventing the theft of art and antiquities,
preventing the illegal excavation of antiquities, preventing the mutilation
and destruction of ancient structures and sites, creating a means for
preserving sites and monuments, and even righting past wrongs. This
piece justifies the new conceptualization in two ways. First, by showing
that properly distinguishing property and heritage will allow us to better
protect heritage with a richer, fuller understanding of the concept. And
second, by demonstrating how current definitions lead to imprecise
analysis, which may produce troubling legal conclusions.
A growing body of heritage law has extended the limitations periods
for certain cultural disputes. This has shifted the calculus for the long-
term control of real, movable, and even digital property. This can be
acutely seen with respect to cultural repatriation claims-specifically the
claims of claimants to works of art forcibly taken during World War II;
or the claims by Peru to certain anthropological objects now in the
possession of Yale University which were removed by Hiram Bingham
in the early part of the 20th Century.
* Assistant Professor, South Texas College of Law; PhD University of Aberdeen;
JD Wake Forest. Special thanks to Peter Morris for research assistance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Oxford, Alabama a conflict has emerged over what should
happen to a small earthen mound likely constructed by indigenous tribes
more than a thousand years ago.' The stones sit behind a strip mall just
off the interstate, and local developers have sought permission to use the
mound as fill dirt for other new commercial developments. Should local
businesses be permitted to exploit this mound of earth for future
development-which the city surely needs and would produce immediate
economic benefits-or should the site and the knowledge it contains be
preserved for future generations? This ongoing dispute draws lines
between two ways of thinking about places, objects, and ideas: either as
property reducible to interests, or as heritage.
This article draws out the heritage doctrines from traditional
property law to examine what specific doctrines might be approached
from a heritage perspective. It looks to the nature of heritage and
property and erects a set of principles for distinguishing the two.
Property has been the traditional means by which individuals order these
interactions, yet a powerful and different idea of heritage has
increasingly challenged the lofty position enjoyed by property.
New concepts of heritage offer a helpful counterpart to property.
This article examines and distinguishes property and heritage. Lyndel
Prott noted in 1989 that "the legal definition of the cultural heritage is
one of the most difficult confronting scholars today." 2 The intervening
years have seen a number of attempts to further define the concept, while
the idea of heritage plays an increasingly important role in areas like
digital culture, environmental heritage, environmental protection, and the
disposition of cultural objects.
Heritage should be defined as the physical and intangible elements
associated with a group of individuals which are created and passed from
generation to generation. The idea of heritage carries an implicit series
of choices whether heritage should be accepted from past generations,
and if so whether it should passed on to future generations.
1. Campbell Robertson, When Scholarship and Tribal Heritage Face Off Against
Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/us/oxford.html? r-1.
2. Lyndel V. Prott, Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the
Cultural Heritage, V RECUEIL DES COURs 224 (1989).
3. As Janet Blake notes, "[t]here exists a difficulty of interpretation of the core
concepts of 'Cultural heritage' (or 'cultural property') and 'cultural heritage of mankind'
and as yet no generally agreed definition of the content of these terms appears to exist."
Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 61, 62-63 (2000).
4. This stands as the author's definition of heritage, and though it necessarily
suffers from a lack of particularity, the idea of property also shares these frailties. As
Lyndel Prott and Patrick J. O'Keefe argue:
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Furthermore, this definition encompasses a surprising breadth of objects
and ideas.
Heritage may take many forms. There exists material heritage,
intangible heritage, and natural heritage.5  Material heritage includes
buildings,6 works of art,7 as well as antiquities and their archaeological
context.8 Property can of course be tangible or intangible also. Yet not
every intangible can be the object of property rights. Ideas such as
goodwill,9 love songs,'o celebrity identity," and even ideas themselvesl 2
are all manifestations of human expression which are not reducible to
property law. For some of these objects, the idea of heritage offers a
powerful instrument to order our relationships with these objects and
concepts. Taken as a whole, the scholarship which examines heritage
has suffered by taking a myopic view of the concept, too often focusing
on indigenous groups and repatriation. These are worthy avenues of
study and serious debate, yet heritage should be reconceptualized and
applied to a wider series of relationships.
In fact, a similar reconceptualization of property took hold because
of shifting societal conditions: "As important as legal scholarship has
been in articulating a conception of property as a bundle of rights, these
writings would have had little impact without the social, economic, and
Heritage creates a perception of something handed down; something to be
cared for and cherished. These cultural manifestations have come down to us
from the past; they are our legacy from our ancestors. There is today a broad
acceptance of a duty to pass them on to our successors, augmented by the
creations of the present.
Lyndel Prott & Patrick J. O'Keefe, "Cultural Heritage" or "Cultural Property"?, 1
INr'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 311 (1992).
5. A recent Westlaw search in August of 2010 for legislation using the works
cultural heritage" by the author revealed 171 Federal statutes and 899 state statutes
which use the term.
6. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (in which
the Supreme Court held a city's action to preserve the Grand Central Terminal was not a
taking and therefore did not require just compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
7. Federal law makes it a crime to steal an object of cultural heritage from a
museum, and defines an object of cultural heritage as an object that is in the custody or
control of a museum and is over 100 years old and worth in excess of $5,000, or is worth
at least $100,000. 18 U.S.C. § 668 (2010).
8. For example, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act protects material
remains of human life or activities that are at least 100 years old and of archaeological
interest. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm
(2006).
9. Sorrano's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316-17 (9th Cir.1989).
10. See Quackenbush Music, Ltd. v. Wood, 381 F. Supp. 904 (D. Tenn. 1974).
11. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
12. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) ("no
author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates").
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political forces that demanded a reconceptualization of property."' 3 Put
another way, our view of property must have a strong descriptive
component, examining and anticipating the ways in which property
manifests itself. In a similar way, heritage must also have a descriptive
component.
Heritage and property are two fundamentally different approaches
to examining and ordering human expression. They are often at odds-
but not always. In many cases, objects which we would classify as
heritage may be owned as property. This class of objects can be
described as cultural property. Jeremy Bentham argued that property
may carry certain elements of heritage and intrinsic value which if taken
from us may "[rend] us to the quick."1 4
Our notions of property adapt and shift. Advances in technology
meant that ownership of land has changed to deny the ownership of the
air space over that land. This idea-the ad coelum doctrine-has been
eclipsed by the reality of air travel; else "every transcontinental flight
would subject the operator to countless trespass suits."' 5 Edmund Burke
argued we must preserve our heritage, lest successive generations risk
undoing the good works of their forebears.16 Burke was decrying the
damage and destruction committed during the French revolution. This
paper takes up Burke's argument and shows how the law can better
prevent society from wasting its inheritance. Conventional property
13. Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 288 (2002).
14. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 115 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931).
As Bentham argued:
Every part of my property may have, in my estimation, besides its intrinsic
value, a value of affection-as an inheritance from my ancestors, as the reward
of my own labour, or as the future dependence of my children. Everything
about it represents to my eye that part of myself which I have put into it-those
cares, that industry, that economy which denied itself present pleasures to make
provision for the future. Thus our property becomes a part of our being, and
cannot be torn from us without rending us to the quick.
Id.
15. Vincent Chiappetta, The (Practical) Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 297, 315 (2009) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
16. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 53 (London,
1790). Burke stated:
But one of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth
and the laws are consecrated, is lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in
it, unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due
to their posterity, should act as if they were the entire masters; that they should
not thin it amongst their rights to cut off the entail, or commit waste on the
inheritance, by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their
society; hazarding to leave to those who come after them a ruin, instead of a
habitation-and teaching these successors a little to respect their contrivances,
as they had themselves respected the institutions of their forefathers.
Id.
644 [Vol. 115:3
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frameworks cannot frilly account for the interests and values necessary to
adequately preserve heritage. Property and heritage interact, but the two
concepts can be separated in a mutually beneficial way. Though some
have argued we might be better normatively served by using a property
framework,'7 this paper argues the two concepts are fundamentally
separable.
This article first presents an overview of recent property law theory,
showing that even this venerable concept has been subjected to criticism
and problems of definition. This article then compares heritage law to
this property theory. The piece then concludes that property and heritage
should be properly distinguished because they are two distinct bodies of
law with separable goals. Properly distinguishing property and heritage
allows for a richer, fuller understanding of both concepts. Current
definitions of property and heritage foster imprecision and inaccurate
legal conclusions.
II. OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PROPERTY
A. The Traditional View
To properly distinguish property from heritage, we must first revisit
the core idea of property itself. Property law has traditionally been seen
as the best way to protect owners.' A traditional view of property
recognizes that property protects right-holders from other individuals and
groups which allows for a decentralized governing body.19 Others view
property rules as a network of relationships which foster communities.20
There are a number of justifications for property rights, including legal
recognition of "labor, its cousin first possession, individual self-
definition and autonomy, stewardship, divine right, utility, collective
good, need, and power." 21 James Madison argued property law comes
from "that dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world in exclusion of every other individual."22
Richard Pipes defines property as "the right of the owner or owners,
formally acknowledged by public authority, both to exploit assets to the
17. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
18. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
19. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW
139-42, 238 (2000).
20. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
21. Chiappetta, supra note 15, at 303-04 (citations omitted).
22. J. MADISON, PROPERTY, IN THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981).
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exclusion of everyone else and to dispose of them by sale or
otherwise."23 The right to exclude provides a "rough but low-cost
method of generating information that is easy for the rest of the world to
understand."2 4 This definition allows a property owner to do just about
whatever they wish with it.2 5 This deeply-rooted idea of property which
allows for individual use only will necessarily prevent the values of
stewardship from gaining hold, and may even lead to the waste and
destruction of heritage for future generations.
If we accept that certain classes of human expression should be
passed on to future generations, property-centric frameworks may result
in some pernicious consequences. As Sarah Harding has argued, "the
concept of ownership in a single person or entity persists and pervades
our understanding of the concept of property." 26 Yet this traditional view
carries an implicit choice and ordering of the importance of values, and
property may in some cases help to further important values such as
environmental protection.
Property law has often been compared to a bundle of rights. In fact,
"the bundle" has dominated property theory. 2 7 The metaphor envisions
property as a bundle of sticks, each one representing a right associated
with property. These rights can include the right to: exclude, possess,
use, manage, receive income and capital, maintain, transfer, enjoy with
the absence of term; the prohibition of harmful uses; and the liability to
execution. 2 8
The concept was perhaps first used in 1888, "[t]he dullest individual
among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is
a bundle of rights." 29 This view soon gained increasing support, as one
commentator writing in 1922 noted "property has ceased to describe any
res or object of sense at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal
relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities."30 Indeed, Benjamin
23. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, xv (2000).
24. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law ofNuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 971 (2004).
25. Edward J. McCaffery & Stephen Munzer, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76, 76 (2001)
(criticizing the idea of a right to waste).
26. Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation ofNative American Cultural Property, 72
IND. L.J. 723, 759 (1997).
27. Arnold, supra note 13, at 284 n. 18.
28. Anthony M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 107,
113-24 (A. G. Guest ed., Clarendon Press 1961).
29. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
43 (2d ed. 1900).
30. Arthur L. Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429-
31, 429 (1922).
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Cardozo early in the 20th century argued that the concept of property
must shift to accommodate new realities. 3 1
Yet the prominence of the bundle metaphor has led to criticism.
Some have argued that there must be some object of the rights in this
bundle, and have argued property deals with legal relationships among
people with respect to things.32 The connection between property rights
and things has been under-examined, which has prompted some scholars
to look at the rights in the bundle as a web of relationships among people
with respect to valuable resources. 33 We have witnessed a shift then
from Blackstone's 18th century definition of property from "sole and
despotic dominion" 34 to "a set of legal relations among persons." 35 Put
another way, property in the 19 th century was shifting from
"Blackstonian physicalism and absolutism to the bundle of rights." 36
Changes in society and technology were shifting the way scholars
viewed property. The idea that property was a tangible thing over which
an owner had complete dominion was declining,3 7 and the social
dimensions of private property envisaged in Blackstone's writings was
38
gaining increased currency.
This really took hold when Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld offered
important contributions to the bundle of rights conception with a series
of essays between 1913 and 1917.39 He argued that property consists of
fundamental legal relations which can be four jural opposites: (1) right-
31. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928).
32. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2
(3D ED. 1989). LANCE LIEBMAN, A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 1 (2001).
33. NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 19 (1997).
34. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (David S.
Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thome eds., Oxford 3d ed. 1979) (1765).
35. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: the
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 328-30 (1980);
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 27-28 (1988).
36. Arnold, supra note 13, at 288 citing Thomas C. Grey, The Disentegration of
Property, in PROPERTY NoMos XXII, 69-85 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1980); Vandevelde, supra note 35.
37. Vandevelde, supra note 35, at 333-59.
38. See FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 11, 13 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or,
Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998) (arguing Blackstone thought about limits
to exclusive private control over things but also an individual's obligations to others);
Stephen R. Munzer, Property and Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, 33 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001) (noting Blackstone
recognized rights in intangibles).
39. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
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no right, (2) privilege-duty, (3) power-disability, and (4) immunity-
liability. 4 0 Hohfeld thought of property as a cluster of attributes, which
allowed for a great range of forms and functions for property ownership.
He revealed the relations between rights and correlative duties. Others
have taken up this idea. Felix Cohen argues that property is "relations
between people" which offers "exclusions which individuals can impose
or withdraw with state backing against the rest of society."AI This "state
backing" of individual right offers a Hohfeldian jural relation between
exclusion and access. Charles Reich extended the definition in arguing
that property should include entitlements to government benefits and
services because of the fundamental values advanced by recognizing
these property rights.4 2
Yet perhaps because of the primacy of the bundle metaphor, it has
met a good deal of criticism. Some argue it focuses on rights but
minimizes any duties right holders may owe.43 Arnold suggests the
bundle "masks an essentially individualistic, commodifying, acquisitive
concept of property every bit as reified and anti-social as the
Blackstonian concept. 4 4  Moreover it does not have any efficient
boundaries, which might produce over-propertization.4 5 Property has
been stretched and extended when, for example, courts decide cases
involving body parts, 4 6 trade secrets,47 gene fragments,48 certain aspects
40. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 39, at 30.
41. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 357-87
(1954).
42. Charles A Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1963).
43. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 16-18
(2000) (arguing the bundle of rights does not address obligations); JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD 16-18 (2001) (looking at what social responsibilities
may accompany ownership); John E. Cribbet, Property Lost: Property Regained, 23 PAC.
L.J. 93, 101 (1991) ("If we view property as primarily a matter of private rights and
public regulation as destructive of those rights, we have forgotten the lessons of the
past.").
44. Arnold, supra note 13, at 290.
45. Rose, supra note 38 at 278-85 (using that when we think about the bundle of
sticks we need to think of the whole bundle, not just the individual sticks); Tom W. Bell,
Review: The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV.1746-1770, 1764-67 (1999)
(warning about the over-propertization of cyberspace); Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1189-91 (1999) (describing the
harms which can occur if we look at the property rights in the bundle in isolation);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (arguing Property must "track
a limited number of standard forms" in the way the civil law does under the numerus
clausus principle does, which would produce a number of benefits.).
46. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990).
47. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-05 (1984).
48. See Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual property rights in
genes and gene fragments: A registration solution for expressed sequence tags, 85 IOWA
L. REV. 735-1835 (2000).
648 [Vol. 115:3
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of software,49 campaign contributions,5 o and even racial identity.' The
bundle concept does not allow us to separate property rights from other
rights, thereby diminishing the concept of property and offering little real
guidance when courts must define property rights. 52 Some have gone so
far as to argue the "metaphor of property as a bundle of rights is
seriously misleading,"53 and even "little more than a slogan." 54 Above
all, by focusing only on rights and relationships, we can ignore the
characteristics of the object of the rights, or "thingness."
B. Reconceptualizing Property
Property now does not deal just with things but with social
relationships as well.56 Arnold has argued that we should replace the
metaphor of property as a bundle of rights with property as a web of
interests: "a robust, comprehensive concept of private property is
necessary to advance environmental values, and conversely, a decline in
the importance and meaning of property hurts environmental values....
The appropriate environmental response to this problem is to articulate a
comprehensive understanding of property emphasizing the importance of
human-object relationships."57  Arnold argues that property theorists
need to "reconstitute property: to articulate a conception of property that
integrates both its humanness and its thingness." In the same way,
heritage can and should be defined as a competing, sometimes
overlapping metaphor of a different web of interests.
In fact, property has several prominent features that reflect the
"intellectual and social forces" which have helped to "reconceptualize"
it.5 9 If we think first about what kind of features a legal concept of
heritage may have, then we can examine which features should be added
49. See Richard H. Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U.
PITT. L. REv. 1229 (1985).
50. See Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property
Characteristics ofPolitical Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2000).
51. See Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1123, 1132 (1997).
52. See JIM HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 119-61 (1996); WALDRON, supra note
35 at 29, 33, 52; Grey, supra note 36; Vandevelde, supra note 35 at 362-67.
53. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1849, 1867 (2007).
54. J. E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,
714 (1995).
55. Arnold, supra note 13, at 291.
56. Singer, supra note 43; Munzer, supra note 25, at 36-75; see also Cohen, supra
note 41, at 359-65, 378-79.
57. Arnold, supra note 13, at 281.
58. Id. at 284.
59. Id at 289.
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or subtracted in order to make heritage distinct from property. Primarily,
we might point to the notions of bestowing heritage on future
generations, and receiving heritage bestowed by our forebears. Would
adding these features then subvert property and make it something
incompatible with the current view of property. As a result then, do we
need to find a similar reconceptualization for heritage? Arnold argues
the definition of property has been distorted because of attempts to
account for the difficult cases on the margins.6 0 We have gotten away
from thinking about an "ideal" definition. This has two consequences:
"(1) it confuses legal actors, scholars, and non-specialists with a greater
sense of property law's indeterminacy than may be justified by a more
comprehensive analysis; and (2) it constantly recasts property doctrine
and norms according to odd cases rather than according to typical
cases."61
Property can be separated in a way that heritage cannot. It is
disaggregable. The different rights which come together to form the
bundle of stickS62-a perhaps too-common metaphor for property
rights-can be separated and analyzed in isolation. There may not even
be a single property rights holder but rather a number of individuals with
interests and relationships to one another. Property may also be
commoditized, bought, and sold.63 Property has also been surprisingly
adaptable. As Arnold argues, "[n]ew rights in property can be
conceived. New sets of rights can be bundled. New objects of property
rights can be identified. The conception of property, when defined so
broadly and abstractly as a bundle of rights can change with changing
social needs and values."64 As a result of this overbreadth, we have
created an imperfect definition, which has overtaken what should be
heritage in some cases, thus producing some bad consequences. Though
Arnold is correct in pointing out that property "functions" because it
"serves social needs and values, unhindered by formalistic constraints or
narrow conceptions."65
Yet property can also be viewed as a continuum with sole and
despotic dominion resting at one end. Chiappetta argues that in this
continuum, "[s]ole and despotic dominion only represents one endpoint
60. Id. at 295.
6 1. Id.
62. Id at 289-90.
63. Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MicH. L. REv. 757, 808
(2009) ("Doctrines of alienability, however, also inject a malleability to transfers around
property that is less present where categories are stable. This allows people to treat land
as a commodity, but also increases the pressure to preserve status and also, of course,
gives fuel for further accumulation.").
64. Arnold, supra note 13, at 289.
65. Id. at 290.
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of an extremely nuanced continuum of successively less absolute
ownership possibilities eventually reaching the other terminus of 'none.'
Adopting only the most extreme of the possible alternatives as the
definition of property unjustifiably narrows the scope of public policy
debate. It is time to stop maligning Blackstone and treat sole and
despotic dominion as the straw man it is." 6 6
And yet scholars have argued that property as a concept is in
decline.67 Thomas Grey examined the limits of looking at property as a
bundle of rights. He pointed to a number of changes in the ways of
thinking about property, changes that he argued signaled the end of
property as a clear bright-line concept.6 8  Without clear boundaries,
property as a concept can after all shed its usefulness. 6 9 Property is, as
Arnold argues, "a malleable, divisible, disaggregable, functional set of
rights among people."70 Property interests can be created in intangibles,
but also tangibles, and in abstract concepts, but also concrete realities.
As the distinction between property rights and other kinds of rights
breaks down, their categorization is a matter of convenience or public
policy, and thus it offers no conceptual coherence.7 1 The current study of
property remains positivist and pragmatic; for example the study of
72property law in law school mainly teaches the basics of real estate.
And so long as this is the case, the full complexity of human ideas and
expression will elude sound ordering by the legal system.
In fact, property shifts to meet the form of human expression or
object. No single overarching theory of property can be found, rather we
should consider the "practical" function of the concept. Property
responds to different needs. As Hanoch Dagan argues, "the fee simple
absolute [allocates] a rather robust bundle of entitlements to owners, thus
providing the safe haven from others' demands that is indeed a
precondition for independence." 74  Other forms of property like co-
ownership or marital property may "provide diverse frameworks for
66. Chiappetta, supra note 15, at 314.
67. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 693-
702 (1985); Joseph Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L.
REv. 481 (1983).
68. Arnold, supra note 13, at 282.
69. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-o-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REv. 239, 256 (1994).
70. Grey, supra note 36, at 82.
71. Id. at 70, 74-80.
72. Arnold, supra note 13, at 293 (citations omitted).
73. See generally Chiappetta, supra note 15.
74. Hanoch Dagan, From Independence and Interdependence to the Pluralism of
Property, in Property, State and Community, 22 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1602017 (last visited March 27, 2011).
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various types and degrees of interdependence, mutual responsibility, and
solidarity."75 Yet the fundamental connection property shares with the
individual, and the ability of owners to manipulate their interests in
property leave property unable to effectively navigate heritage resources.
John Sprankling has argued there are certain biases in property law,
and has offered specific reforms. He argues that wilderness should be
exempted from the doctrine of adverse possession.76 He also argues that
the good husbandry test of the doctrine of waste should be replaced by
what he calls a "prudent preservation" standard for wilderness lands, a
rebuttable presumption should be erected that the good faith-improver
doctrine cannot apply to wilderness, and the nuisance doctrine should
account for injury to nature, not just humans.n Thomas Jefferson argued
against the overpropertization of inventions:
It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an
individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and
stable property. If nature has made any one thing less susceptible
than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking
power called an idea. . . . Inventions then cannot in nature, be a
subject of property.
Robert P. Merges has pointed out the bias in the Lockean view of
property by noting that "true property rights ... are held by individuals
who work on things so as to justify removal from the primordial
commons." 79 John Locke's view of government excludes certain groups.
He noted, "[t]hus in the beginning all the World was America," which
assumes that when Europeans met Native Americans the indigenous
peoples could not acquire rights in the land because their use of the land
did not constitute "labor."80 Despite these shortcomings, real property
enjoys rigid constitutional protections." Justice Scalia has argued this
can be attributed to the historical expectation that real property is a
75. Id.
76. John G. Sprankling, Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 816, 864-84 (1993).
77. John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U.
CHI. L. REv. 519, 588-90 (1996).
78. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813), XIII in
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Albert Ellery Bergh ed.,1907), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jeffersonjapers/mtjserl.html.
79. Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of
Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1185 (2008) (emphasis added).
80. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 301 (Peter Laslett ed., 3d ed.
1988).
81. The Fifth Amendment prevents the government taking of private property
without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.").
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unique and immovable resource.8 2 The expectations view of property
promotes settled justified expectations from a utilitarian perspective. As
Jeremy Bentham wrote, "Property is nothing but a basis of expectation;
the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are
said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards
it."83 The concept uses Bentham's utilitarianism to protect a property
owner's investment-backed expectations when a government taking
arises.8 4 It has been used to consider the expectation of a worker via
their employment and the property of the employer, which these workers
help to create and change.
1. Property as Independence or Interdependence
Hanoch Dagan has attempted to reveal the "core normative essence
of property" by dividing recent property scholarship as conceiving
property as either independent or interdependent. 8 6 He shows recent
attempts to find property take a position either via Kant as a "castle of
independence," or an Aristotelian position that property is in fact
founded on interdependence. He concludes that it is this "multiplicity
of property institutions is the key to property's normative promise.
Property can be the home of both independence and interdependence
(and can serve the other property values as well), and thus provides
people with valuable options of human flourishing."88 We can extend
Dagan's view to easily encompass ideas of heritage as well. By
extending the Aristotelian end of the spectrum to encompass the
interdependence not just of individuals but of generations of individuals,
the law can better value our collective and individual heritage. Dagan
himself argues that property law and theory are not "doomed to a
fundamental contradiction between two poles." 89 We should take "the
heterogeneity" of property theory seriously and we can understand
property by examining the "umbrella of property institutions." 90 What
emerges are two theories which purport to advance different ends of the
82. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 , 1027-28 (1992).
83. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931)
(1802).
84. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. I165, 1258, 1211-12, 1229-
34(1967).
85. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 611 (1988).
86. Dagan, supra note 74, at 1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id at 3.
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property-doctrine spectrum but which are in fact strikingly similar:
"Neo-Kantians present a monistic account, purporting to transcend a
profound conceptual tension. Similarly, the neo-Aristotelian theory
offers an understanding of property that purports to govern the entire
terrain of property law."91
First, let's find the sources of the independence property
scholarship. Dagan distills two recent neo-Kantian accounts of property,
one by Arthur Ripstein,92 and the other by Ernest Weinrib.9 3  Dagan
argues that "Kant's conception of the right to personal independence,
which differs from other, more robust conceptions of autonomy,
understood as the ability to be the author of one's life, choosing among
worthwhile life plans, and being able to pursue one's choices."9 4 This
also finds support in the traditional view of property-that property is
what lawyers call the rights that individuals have with respect to objects
and ideas. Yet there are a number of these property rights, and they are
connected. The Aristotelian interdependence view can be traced to
recent attempts to create a relational theory of property using Aristotle.
Highlighting recent work by Gregory Alexander and Eduardo M.
Pefialver, Dagan states that this new account "highlights the crucial role
of property in fostering virtuous human interdependence." 95 We are left
then with competing ideas of property which are counterproductive.
Neither of these doctrines can or should explain the entire property
landscape. Similar arguments and dualistic fallacies have emerged with
respect to cultural property. 9 6 One of the emerging trends in property
91. Id. at 6.
92. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (2009).
93. Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 795 (2002).
94. Dagan, supra note 74, at 4.
95. Dagan, supra note 74, at 6-9 (citing GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970
(1999); Eduardo M. Peijalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005);
Gregory S Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2008); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pefialver, Properties
of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127 (2009)).
96. Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical
Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 690, 693-94 (2008).
As Bauer argues:
[T]he debates continue over the trade in archaeological and cultural objects and
what the best methods to regulate it are, if indeed it should be regulated at all.
These debates are contentious, emotional, and often contain not-so-subtle
claims about the relative morality of its interlocutors. At one end are those who
believe that everyone has a shared interest in and claim to the common heritage
of humanity. . . . On the other end are those who believe that the heritage of
humanity is best secured through the recognition that cultural objects have
special significance for specific groups.
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law has been to trace these connections and to show how property rights
can be traced to component actors in a community. One of the most
powerful ideas has been to see the personhood in property.
2. Personhood and Property
The personhood theory of property looks at how objects are
important to human identity and freedoms.97  Margaret Radin has
examined this concept of property in a series of important books and
articles.9 8 She argues some kinds of property deserve greater legal
protection because they express individual personhood and should be
nonfungible. 99 The features of individual objects are not as important as
the relationship and meaning these objects create with their "holders".' 00
Radin divides property objects as either fungible or constitutive.'
Fungible objects do not have any role in creating personhood
because a fungible object is "perfectly replaceable with other goods of
equal market value."' 0 2 Constitutive property though is property which
carries special meaning for the holder such that "its loss causes pain that
cannot be relieved by the object's replacement." 0 3 Examples of fungible
property might be a sum of currency; while one's wedding ring may be
constitutive.10 4 Yet these relationships are subjective, depending on the
person. Even money may be constitutive as it can protect us from the
unknown, offer validation for one's choices, and can carry meaning for
more than just commodity.'0o Radin argues that personal property
"should be protected to some extent against invasion by government and
Id.
97. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35-71 (1993) [hereinafter
RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY].
98. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 97; MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) [hereinafter RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES];
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
[hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood]; Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability];
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, The
Liberal Conception ofProperty]; Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace,
15 J. L. & COM. 509 (1995) [hereinafter Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace].
99. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 98, at 959.
100. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 97, at 57-59.
101. Id at 2 (using the term "personal property" to connote property constitutive of
the person, though she admits possible confusion because the term "personal property"
has long been used to contrast "real property").
102. Id. at 37.
103. Id.
104. Id at 57-58.
105. See KENNETH 0. DOYLE, THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF MONEY AND PROPERTY
(1999).
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against cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims of other
people," while fungible property rights "should yield to some extent in
the face of conflicting fungible property claims of other people . .. [and]
recognized personhood interests."1 06 Legal rules should not only allow
for the creation of wealth but also to promote human flourishing.'0 7
Property law can promote this human flourishing by "enabling
individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity."108
Carpenter et al. have argued this personhood model allows
indigenous concepts about property to enter into "legal discourse," which
would allow their understanding of land and resources to "make
exceptions to the prevailing 'universal commodification' standard for
property that is nonfungible, incommensurable, and inalienable, as some
indigenous cultural property surely are." 09 They offer this view because
historically there has been limited judicial recognition of heritage. 1o
Sarah Harding has used Radin's model of property and personhood to
show how claims for the repatriation of objects may become increasingly
viable.' 1' Yet this view of property over heritage can be criticized. The
personhood view of property can be extended multi-generationally via
heritage law. Though we might find some important advances for
indigenous and other cultural resources in a personhood theory of
property, we would still be denying what actually happens. Property has
shifted as changes have taken place to society generally.1 2 There is no
better example of this than the changes which have been created in the
law to account for claims to works of art and heritage which span
generations.
C. Limitation Periods and Multigenerational Legal Actions
Works of art and objects of cultural significance inspire emotion.
When disputes involving these objects arise, they have increasingly
involved wrongdoing which has occurred further and further in the past.
Because these objects are extremely valuable and portable, the
tremendous value associated with cultural property encourages thieves or
the dishonest to hide works for long periods of time. These disputes
106. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 98, at 10 14-15.
107. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 98, at 1851.
108. Alexander, supra note 95, at 745.
109. Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1048
(2009).
110. See Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 189 U.S. 306, 309-11 (1903) (holding that
federal courts do not have the jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a state court holding
which prevented the tribe from recovering four wampum belts.).
I 11. Harding, supra note 26, at 725-27.
112. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
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require courts to divine the intentions and actions of past generations,
while also anticipating and evaluating the merits of potential future
generations to a claim. Heritage law has emerged as the loose collection
of doctrines and policies which guide courts and lawmakers in these
disputes.
These heritage laws weigh the facts regarding an earlier theft or
misappropriation which often may have only recently come to light."'
As a result, limitations rules will be particularly relevant."'4 The relevant
limitations rules in the United States are implemented at the state level,
which produces some very different approaches.' The main approaches
are the demand and refusal rule and the discovery rule. The demand and
refusal rule does not start the limitations period until a dispossessed
claimant demands the objects at issue.' 16 The discovery rule takes a
similar kind of approach, but begins the limitations period when a
claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, she had a
claim to an object at issue." 7 hese rules, though grounded in property,
take on a heritage component, as courts are asked to weight the actions of
the present claimants against historical events.
In some cases other equitable doctrines can temper the operation of
these limitation-extending rules. A defendant may use the doctrine of
laches to defend against an action for the return of a work of art when
there is prejudice."18 One such case involved a 19th-century painting by
Franz Xaver Winterhalter titled Girl from the Sabine Mountains. The
current possessor based her defense on laches, arguing that it wouldn't be
fair to allow the claimant to regain title to the work."l 9 Senior Circuit
113. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2nd Cir. 1987). In DeWeerth, a
claimant brought suit to recover a work of art stolen during World War II. The court
noted that the claimants' inaction to consult the proper Catalogue Raisonn6 or conduct
any search whatsoever indicated a lack of diligence. Id. at 111-12.
114. Every state has comprehensive legislation establishing limitations periods of
most actions arising under statutory or common law. Federal actions also have statutes of
limitations. For a general discussion of limitation periods as they pertain to art and
antiquity disputes, see 77 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, Proof of a Claim Involving
Stolen Art or Antiquities §§ 29-33 (2010).
115. For an interesting and thorough examination of the possible impact these state
laws may have on the rules of limitation if adopted in the U.K., see David Carey Miller,
David W. Meyers & Anne L. Cowe, Restitution of Art and Cultural Objects: A
Reassessment of the Role of Limitation, 6 ART, ANTIQUITY, & L. 1, 17 (2001). The
conflict of laws which emerge when limitations periods conflict has created a great deal
of uncertainty in the art market Derek Fincham, How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can
Impede the Flow ofIllicit Cultural Property, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 111, 124-27 (2008).
116. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 318 (N.Y.
1991).
117. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980).
118. Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008).
119. Id. at 56.
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Judge Bruce M. Selya admonished the appellant: "Proving prejudice
requires more than the frenzied brandishing of a cardboard sword; it
requires at least a hint of what witnesses or evidence a timeous
investigation might have yielded." 20
The operation of these statutes of limitation are a potentially
invaluable tool for buyers or sellers of disputed cultural objects.12' They
have had the practical effect of opening up long-past disputes and
wrongdoing to courts of law. They are an expanding area of the law in
which heritage claims have begun to erode the lofty position enjoyed by
property law. For example, an on-going dispute between Peru and Yale
University presents a difficult question for a court,122 requiring the law to
mete out justice with respect to a series of agreements reached with the
Republic of Peru in the years immediately following World War I.123
Also, scholars are increasingly looking at the viability of reparation
actions for former slaves.12 4 These actions present new ways of thinking
about the law, and whatever we might think of the merits or demerits of
these actions, by thinking about heritage law as a multigenerational
mechanism, we can make better informed judgments and predictions
about the direction this body of law may be taking. The origins for much
of this body of law stem from works of art, antiquities, and a body of law
dealing with what has been called cultural property.
C. Cultural Property
A number of definitions exist to describe cultural property. Cultural
property has been referred to as the "fourth estate" of property, along
with real property, intellectual property, and personal property.125 The
flagship international convention defines cultural property as
"specifically designated by each State as being of importance for
120. Id at 58.
121. For a discussion of the importance of limitations periods to cultural heritage
disputes see Derek Fincham, Towards a Rigorous Standard for the Good Faith
Acquisition ofAntiquities, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & CoM. 145, 189-201 (2010).
122. John Christoffersen, Senator Christopher Dodd Says Artifacts Held by Yale
Belong to Peru, AP, June 15, 2010, http://www.artdaily.org/index.asp?intsec=2&int
new=38572 (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
123. David Glenn, Peru v. Yale: A Battle Rages Over Machu Picchu, THE CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, April 3, 2009, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Peru-v-Yale-
A-Battle-Rages/13277.
124. See Helen Bishop Jenkins, DNA and the Slave-Descendant Nexus: A Theoretical
Challenge to Traditional Notions ofHeirship Jurisprudence, 16 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.
J. 211 (2000).
125. Steven Wilf, What Is Property's Fourth Estate? Cultural Property and the
Fiduciary Ideal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 177 (2000).
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archeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which
belongs to" a number of listed categories. 126
Cultural property encompasses a number of different ideas and
shifting concepts and has suffered from insufficient definitions. At least
part of the difficulty in choosing a coherent definition stems from the
tension between two distinct concepts, "property" and "culture." Patty
Gerstenblith defines cultural property as "two potentially conflicting
elements," which are "culture" and "property." 2 7 The former is
comprised of values derived from a group of people,12 8 while the latter
carries with it the conflicting and value laden attachment society and
legal thinkers attach to an individual rights-based legal principle.' 2 9 In
contrast, John Merryman has defined cultural property as "objects that
embody the culture." 30
Cultural property law and theory are increasingly used as a way for
groups to seek property law protections for their cultural heritage.
Native American groups have used trademark rights in tribal symbols.' 3 '
Mardi Gras Indians-the African American groups which have taken
their culture from Native American groups near New Orleans-have
begun using copyright law to receive compensation from the stunning
photos taken when the Mardi Gras Indians parade.' 32 Property principles
have allowed for the return of Native American objects from certain
American museums, 33 the protection of sacred sites with easements, 3 4
and have used these laws to seek compensation for the taking of their
126. 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property art. 1, 96 Stat. at 2351, 823
U.N.T.S. at 234, 236. See also Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act,
Pub. L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2350 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613) (implementing
the UNESCO Convention in the United States).
127. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 567 (1995).
128. Id at 561-62, 566.
129. Id at 567.
130. John Henry Merryman, "Protection" of the Cultural "Heritage"?, 38 AM. J.
COMP. L., (Supplement) 513, 529 (1990).
13 1. See Phil Patton, DESIGN NOTEBOOK; Trademark Battle Over Pueblo Sign,
N.Y. TIMES, January 13, 2000, at Fl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/13/
garden/design-notebook-trademark-battle-over-pueblo-sign.html?sec=&spon=&page
wanted=all (recounting how the Zia pueblo has used trademark law to protect a sun
symbol the tribe has been using since 1200).
132. See Campbell Robertson, Want to Use My Suit? Then Throw Me Something,
N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2010, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/
us/24orleans.html.
133. See KATHLEEN S. FINE-DARE, GRAVE INJUSTICE: THE AMERICAN INDIAN
REPATRIATION MOVEMENT AND NAGPRA 91-97 (2002).
134. See United States v. Platt, 730 F. Supp 318, 323 (D. Ariz. 1990) (granting the
Zuni Pueblo a "prescriptive easement" to lands owned by a private rancher which
allowed the completion of a sacred Zuni pilgrimage).
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lands, resources, and traditional knowledge.135  Tatiana Flessas has
described the expansion of the concept of cultural property to encompass
fauna, flora, minerals, historical objects, or objects which invoke
important national memories, paleontological goods, and items of
interest to anthropologists and other specialized researchers.13 6
There exist three main justifications for property ownership.13 ' The
first is a libertarian justification that individuals acquire rights in property
because of the labor they use to fashion the property. 13 8 The second, a
utilitarian theory, argues society as a whole benefits from private-not
public-rights in some forms of property. 139  Finally there is the
personality theory, which argues that one can produce rights in an object
by imposing one's will upon it.14 0 Use of the term "property" to describe
art and antiquities may be criticized on one level as it may presuppose a
market for the objects or the necessity of a market. In an influential call
for a reform of cultural discourse, Lyndel Prott and Patrick O'Keefe
argued for a shift from talking about cultural property to discussing
cultural heritage.141 As Margaret Jane Radin argues, it may be necessary
to develop a scheme of partial or complete commodification of some
objects of property and services so as to maximize personal liberty and
contextuality.142
A number of scholars have argued for strong property rights in
cultural objects. John Henry Merryman may be the most notable,
arguing that cultural property includes a "limited range of objects that are
distinguishable from the ordinary run of artifacts by their special cultural
significance and/or rarity," and it "centrally includes the sorts of things
that dealers deal in, collectors collect, and museums acquire and display:
principally works of art, antiquities, and ethnographic objects."' 43 The
1954 Hague convention describes cultural property by noting "damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to
the cultural heritage of all mankind." 144 An important voice in the
135. See Carpenter, Katyal, & Riley, supra note 109, at 1025.
136. Tatiana Flessas, Cultural Property Defined, and Redefined as Nietzschean
Aphorism, 24 CARDOzo L. REv. 1067, 1072-73 (2003).
137. Gerstenblith, supra note 127, at 568.
138. LOCKE, supra note 80, at Book II, ch. V, §§ 26-27.
139. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 98, at 958.
140. See William H Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335,
1335-68 (1990).
141. Prott and O'Keefe, supra note 4.
142. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 98, at 1903.
143. John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property Internationalism, 12 INT'L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 11, 11-12 (2005).
144. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215. The phrase first appears in the Preamble of
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archaeology community, Clemency Coggins, has said cultural property
"will continue to be a useful term as long as anyone can own parts of the
cultural heritage."l 45
Yet cultural property has been criticized as well. A rich body of
scholarship has examined and even criticized the idea of cultural
property. 14 6 As Edward Rothstein argues, cultural property "illuminates
neither the particular culture involved nor its relationship to a current
political entity. It may be useful as a metaphor, but it has been more
commonly used to consolidate cultural bureaucracies and state
control."1 4 7
Cultural property has difficulty fitting within existing property law
and theory. Eric Posner has argued that cultural property is theoretically
indistinguishable from other forms of property and we should allow a
market-based free exchange in these objects.148 Posner attributes the
protection and repatriation of cultural property to "moral error":
A starting point is that cultural property, like any form of property, is
valuable to the extent that people care about it and are willing to pay
or consume or enjoy it. If cultural property is 'normal' property, then
there is no reason to regulate it, or to treat it as different from other
forms of propert In an unregulated market, the people who value it
most will buy it.
Yet Posner makes a fatal error in assuming the cultural property
market is in fact regulated in a meaningful way. The current trade in art
and antiquities suffers from tremendous under-regulation because buyers
and sellers are not required to transmit important title information when
the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict.
145. Clemency C. Coggins, United States Cultural Property Legislation: Observation
of a Combatant, 7 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 52, n. 19 (1998).
146. See, e.g., SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OwNs CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND
AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2005); KATE FITZ GIBBON, WHO OWNS THE PAST?:
CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (2005); Alexander A. Bauer,
New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities
Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 690 (2008); Sarah Harding, Defining Traditional
Knowledge-Lessons from Cultural Property, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511
(2003); Derek Fincham, Why U.S. Federal Criminal Penalties for Dealing in Illicit
Cultural Property Are Ineffective, and a Pragmatic Alternative, 25 CARDOZo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 597 (2007); Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34
STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982).
147. Edward Rothstein, Antiquities, the World Is Your Homeland, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2008, at El, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/arts/design/27conn.
html? r-I&pagewanted=all.
148. Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some
Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213, 222 (2007).
149. Id at 222.
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objects are bought and sold.150  Posner makes another mistake in
assuming the most highly valued works of art can be found in
museums. 51  He fails to appreciate the role museums and cultural
shapers play in creating the value of an artwork. A work of art will
invariably increase in value when it is on display in New York. Jackson
Pollock's Mural was donated to the University of Iowa, but its value and
importance may be much higher if the work were to be sold and
displayed in New York and elsewhere.152  His criticism undervalues
culture generally. Rosemary Coombe notes that this type of criticism
stems from "the origins of the concept in forms of colonial governance,
acknowledging its complicity with orientalism, and showing how many,
if not most, constructions of tradition and cultural identity were
reifications that served and continue to serve the interests of settler and
colonial elites." 53
Instead, we should focus on the cultural aspects of cultural property.
Anthropologist Michael F. Brown has called for an increased emphasis
on culture in two ways. 5 4 First, he criticizes the use of law to govern
many cultural disputes which "forces the elusive qualities of entire
civilizations-everything from attitudes and bodily postures to
agricultural techniques-into ready-made legal categories."' 55 Second,
he argues legal "rights" are too rigid and limit the network of cultural
interests that are shared and transmitted.'56  Brown argues that the
"cultural and intellectual commons are at risk, not the cultural expression
of indigenous peoples."'5 Brown takes up the arguments of Lawrence
Lessig to show that culture and intellectual property are best seen as
forms of creation which are enriched by others, and a collaborative
sharing of these ideas leads to better more fruitful expressions and works
generally, 58
150. See Derek Fincham, Fraud on Our Heritage: Towards a Rigorous Standard for
the Good Faith Acquisition of Antiquities, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. AND COM. 145, 153-
54 (2010).
151. Posner, supra note 148, at 225.
152. Rumors Denied of a Pollock Sale in Iowa, ARTINFO, Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/30315/rumors-denied-of-a-pollock-sale-in-iowa/ (last
visited May 22, 2010).
153. Rosemary J Coombe, Anthropology's Old Vice or International Law's New
Virtue, 93 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 261, 265 (1999).
154. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OwNs NATIVE CULTURE? (2004).
155. Id. at 217.
156. See Michael F. Brown, Culture, Property, and Peoplehood: A Comment on
Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley's "In Defense of Property, " 17 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP.
569, 573-75 (2010).
157. BROWN, supra note 154, at 212-13.
158. See id. at 5; see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE
OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Vintage Books 2002) (2001).
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Over-propertization may in fact produce disastrous consequences.
Brown notes "the difficulty-the near-impossibility . .. of recapturing
information that has entered the public domain."' 59 He offers pointed
criticism of indigenous peoples' attempts to control the portrayal of their
cultural expression within a property-based framework. For example, he
quotes a member of the Klamath Tribe in Oregon: "All this information
gets shared, gets into people's private lives. It's upsetting that the songs
of my relatives can be on the Internet. These spiritual songs live in my
heart and shouldn't be available to just anyone. It disturbs me very
much." 60  Yet these harms are worth the open access and cross-
pollination that technology and attention allow. More diverse cultural
expressions with a tremendous increase in the number and range of
influences create a richer palette for culture-makers to draw on.
Others have criticized the use of property law to exclude and restrict
via ownership and entitlements.161 Naomi Mezey argues that "[t]he
problem with using ideas of cultural property to resolve cultural disputes
is that cultural property uses and encourages an anemic theory of culture
so that it can make sense as a form of property." 6 2  She argues
"[p]roperty is fixed, possessed, controlled by its owner, and alienable.
Culture is none of these things ... cultural property claims tend to fix
culture, which if anything is unfixed, dynamic, and unstable."6  By
linking indigenous rights in a property framework, she fears unwanted
restrictions in cultural expression: "It is the circulation of cultural
products and practices that keeps them meaningful and allows them to
acquire new meaning, even when that circulation is the result of chance
and inequality." 6 4 If we only think in terms of cultural property then we
risk suppressing culture: "As groups become strategically and
emotionally committed to their 'cultural identities,' cultural property
tends to increase intragroup conformity and intergroup intransigence in
the face of cultural conflict."l 6 5  By only concerning itself with
preservation, cultural property risks minimizing the idea of culture itself:
[T]he idea of property has so colonized the idea of culture that there
is not much culture left in cultural property. What is left are
collective property claims on the basis of something we continue to
159. BRoWN, supra note 154, at xi.
160. Id. at 6.
161. See Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
2004 (2007).
162. Id. at 2005.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2007.
165. Id.
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call culture, but which looks increasingly like a collection of things
that we identify superficially with a group of people. 166
Any vibrant set of principles for the governing of objects of culture
must account for the vibrancy of culture. And one fatal flaw of using a
property framework for too much culture will "tend to sanitize culture,
which if it is anything is human and messy, and therefore as ugly as it is
beautiful, as destructive as it is creative, as offensive as it is inspiring.,16 7
Take Italy for example. Any visitor to Rome is bombarded with
crumbling remnants of past empires. Columns, arches, carvings, pieces
of important market centers are the ruble foundation for modem Rome.
Might Italians be sacrificing progress or development by holding too
tightly to some of these remnants? Can there be real tangible benefits
from allowing other cultures and nations to appreciate and even take
away some of these pieces of Roman heritage?
This problem of the magnificent but oppressive past forms the basis
for cosmopolitan criticisms of cultural property. Kwame Anthony
Appiah balances concern for what he calls cultural patrimony with a
desire to preserve cultural objects for everyone:
When Nigerians claim a Nok sculpture as part of their patrimony,
they are claiming for a nation whose boundaries are less than a
century old, the works of a civilization [formed] more than two
millennia ago, created by a people that no longer exists, and whose
descendants we know nothing about. We don't know whether Nok
sculptures were commissioned by kings or commoners; we don't
know whether the people who made them and the people who paid
for them thought of them as belonging to the kingdom, to a man, to a
lineage, to the gods. One thing we know for sure, however, is that
they didn't make them for Nigeria.168
Appiah argues that states act as "trustees for humanity" because
these "Nok sculptures belong in the deepest sense to all of us."l 69
Cultural property issues are not reserved for individual states or peoples
but instead are "an issue for all mankind."o70  Appiah shares the
criticisms of Brown and Mezey when he argues: "We find ourselves
obliged, in theory, to repatriate ideas and experiences."' 7' One
unfortunate example of this might be the attempts by Egypt to copyright
166. Id. at 2005.
167. Id
168. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF
STRANGERS 119 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., W.W. Norton & Company 2006).
169. Id. at 120.
170. Id. at 121.
171. Id. at 129.
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its antiquities, in which Egypt would attempt to require royalties
whenever certain depictions of monuments were made for commercial
purposes. 172  Thinking of aspects of culture as part of a national
patrimony might lead to a "hyper-stringent doctrine of property rights"
which would harm the interests of "audiences, readers, viewers, and
listeners."173 His solution is to "fully respond to 'our' art [is] only if we
,, 174move beyond thinking of it as ours and start to respond to it as art.
D. Cultural Property and Stewardship
In an ambitious recent piece, three authors-Kristen Carpenter,
Sonia Katyal and Angela Riley-attempt to show that "indigenous
cultural property transcends the classic legal concepts of markets, title,
and alienability."' 7 5  They re-conceive indigenous cultural property
claims as a claim involving "peoples" and argue that stewardship should
be used to "explain and justify" indigenous property claims involving
non-owners.176 The authors argue that "because cultural property is
partially intended to repair the ruptures associated with a history of
colonization and capture, it also raises questions about the utility and
appropriateness of property law as a remedy for harms suffered by
indigenous peoples." 7 7  They point to "revolutionary changes" in
cultural property which has elevated the "salience of indigenous peoples'
claims" while also inviting criticism.178  The first shift expanded the
definition outward from "cultural property" to "cultural heritage."'7 The
authors contend that cultural property has expanded from the tangible
into the intangible. 80 They also point to "the increased visibility of
indigenous peoples generally.""s
Carpenter et al. explore the different cultural property protections
have been erected in the United States via property law. This includes
what they term "American cultural property"' 8 2 and "Indian cultural
172. See Egypt 'to Copyright Antiquities,' BBC, Dec. 25, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 7160057.stm. (last visited May 24, 2010).
173. APPIAH, supra note 168, at 130.
174. Id. at 135.
175. Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, supra note 109, at 1027.
176. Id at 1022.
177. Id at 1033.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1033-34; see also Manlio Frigo, Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage: A
"Battle of Concepts" in International Law?, 86 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 367, 369 (2004).
180. Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, supra note 109, at 1034.
181. Id. at 1034-35; Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred
Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1131-
38 (2005).
182. Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley, supra note 109, at 1036.
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property."183 Yet they do not offer any real discussion of why they have
chosen to label these laws and the objects and practices they protect as
"property" rather than heritage. Their efforts, if successful, will likely
lead to a more practical short-term appreciation of indigenous claims,
while sacrificing clarity for the competing concepts of heritage and
property. The authors note that "[c]ultural property's uncertain place in
the property literature flows partly from the inadequacy of traditional
property theory to embrace the unique vision it offers."l 84  Cultural
property is "at heart, a form of property, but that the existing theoretical
framework for cultural property is insufficient to capture its normative
and doctrinal possibilities."'85 The authors reason that "cultural property
protection reflects, in part, the now pervasive view that property is a
bundle of relative, rather than absolute, entitlements, including limited
rights to use, alienate, and exclude."l 86 They put forward an idea of
cultural stewardship as a model. This "trusteeship in cultural property is
often overlooked [. . .] because it indirectly suggests that while a tribe
may act as a fiduciary on behalf of its own tribal members, a much wider
framework of beneficiaries stand to benefit from the protection of the
tribe's cultural property."
All of these criticisms given by Posner, Brown, Mezey, and Appiah
view property the same way, according to Carpenter et al., because "they
all converge on a similar underlying view of property itself as
fundamentally defined by ownership-with its rights of alienability and
exclusion and its norms of commodification and commensurability."'
Thus, there emerges a tension between property law "which focuses on
the utility of markets, exclusion, and commodities, and cultural property,
which necessarily includes interests that are sometimes inexplicable in
market terms."' 89 The bonds that groups create with objects can be very
powerful. Collectively, peoples' connections to an object or monument
creates group rights which regulate that connection. As John Moustakas
argues:
The absence of works representing an "irreplaceable cultural
heritage" is psychologically intolerable. Just as the destruction
of the Statue of Liberty would diminish the bond between
immigrants who shared the same first glimpse of the United
183. Id. at 1036 (citing Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25
U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. (2006)).
184. Id. at 1038.
185. Id. at 1046.
186. Id. at 1066.
187. Id at 1074.
188. Id. at 1046.
189. Id
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States, or the toppling of Jerusalem's Wailing Wall would
wound the spirit of world Jewry, Lord Elgin's removal of the
Parthenon Marbles injures Greek groupness by having
emasculated the greatest of all Greek art-the Parthenon. By
destroying the Greeks' mana, the embodiment of their highest
humanistic hopes and a measure of their existence, Lord Elgin
harmed the Greek grouphood by irreparably diminishing an
integral part of the celebration of "being Greek." 90
The better concept to describe this relationship is heritage, not property.
Kathryn Last has argued that cultural property" is a restrictive concept"
and we should focus instead on "cultural heritage."' 9 1
III. HERITAGE: THE LAWS GOVERNING MULTIGENERATIONAL
DISPUTES
Heritage is the physical and intangible elements associated with a
group of individuals which are created and passed from generation to
generation. Tension between different conceptions of heritage and its
disposition often leads to heated and contentious arguments.192 Lyndel
Prott notes that the "legal definition of the cultural heritage is one of the
most difficult confronting scholars today."1 93 But this problem, one in
fact shared by the concept of property as well, must not prevent us from
looking at the concept and using it to craft solutions to disputes involving
group rights or generation-spanning controversies. Cultural heritage
carries "contrasting values to different groups in our contemporary
society: cultural and heritage values, social and family rights and
prerogatives, scholarly and educational values, even monetary and
economic values." 9 4 When the identity of a people becomes linked to an
object, that group can acquire ownership rights in the object, which may
even make it inalienable, particularly when we consider future
generations who might depend on a connection with the object to
construct their own identity.' 9 5 As such, there exists a substantial amount
of subjectivity in weighing whether any set of elements should be
190. John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict
Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1195-96 (1989).
191. Kathryn Last, The Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes: Some Issues of
Definition, in 7 THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION/PEACE PALACE PAPERS:
RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 53, 53 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2004).
192. Michael Kimmelman, When Ancient Artifacts Become Political Pawns, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/arts/design/
24abroad.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
193. PROTT, supra note 2, at 224.
194. Barbara J. Winter, New Futures for the Past: Cooperation between First Nations
and Museums in Canada, 1995 U. BRI. COLUM. L. R. 29, 35 (1995).
195. Gerstenblith, supra note 127, at 570.
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preserved and bestowed on future generations. Some scholars have
criticized the concept-John Henry Merryman has criticized the term
"heritage" because he takes it to imply a right of repatriation, which may
not be justified by law or policy.196 Yet we must be careful to craft law
and policy which reflects the actual structure of the law.
Janet Blake notes that cultural heritage "has itself been imported
from other academic disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology
without incorporating the theoretical background which led to its
development."l 97 In fact, much of cultural heritage involves a choice-
one which must be ratified by successive generations-about which
elements to cherish and maintain and which to let lapse.198 Blake rightly
points out that we have seen a sharp increase in what has been described
as cultural heritage. The concept originally included only works of art
and "high culture," but has expanded to include cultural objects,
intangible creations, and even scientific knowledge.199 The work of
UNESCO on expressions of traditional culture and folklore have
expanded the definition of what we consider cultural heritage such that
200
physical connections are not the only salient aspect any longer.
Heritage theory also offers a way to think about our natural environment.
There is also a connection between cultural heritage and natural
resources, "[t]hat the natural heritage is global is now beyond dispute.
Fresh water and fossil fuels, rain forests and gene pools are legacies
common to us all and need all care. Cultural resources likewise form
part of the universal heritage." 20' Much connects cultural heritage with
biological diversity; both resources are nonrenewable and important to
the cultural flourishing of many societies.202
Blake unpacks the elements of cultural heritage as reflected in
international law. She finds the common elements are first, a "form of
inheritance to be kept in safekeeping and handed down to future
generations," and second, a "linkage with group identity." 203 This notion
of inheritance and bestowing offer a rich theory with a great deal of
merit. Blake notes that "traditionally, 'cultural property' has generally
been the term of art employed in international law to denote the subject
196. Merryman, supra note 130, at 522.
197. Blake, supra note 3, at 63-64.
198. Id. at 68.
199. Id. at 72.
200. Id. at 72-73.
201. DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE HERITAGE CRUSADE AND THE SPOILS OF HISTORY 228
(Cambridge University Press 1998).
202. Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.61, 71 n.
44 (2000)
203. Blake, supra note 3, at 83-84.
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of protection." 2 04 And yet the use of the term property "carries with it a
range of ideological baggage which is difficult to shed when using the
term in relation to the cultural heritage."205
Heritage is a web of interconnected subjective interests. It is the
manifestation of culture, a reminder of past cultures, and a tool by which
cultures ebb and flow and change over time.2 06  Heritage produces
different characteristics and relationships between other objects and
groups of people than property does. By examining these different
relationships we can see that heritage can be separated from property. In
so doing we are left with a richer understanding of property itself, but
also a framework for the preservation and judicial recognition of
heritage. By exposing the obvious and subtle differences between
heritage and property we can expose the gaps and shortcomings in the
discourse of the law but also expose lacunae where the current law does
not touch heritage. Heritage matters because of its connections made
with the present; "heritage is sanctioned not by proof of origins but by
present exploits . . . gauged not by critical tests but by current
potency." 207 As Derek Gilman points out, "Heritage means different
things to different people, even within the same culture. Whether led by
temperament or agenda, some incline towards myth while others focus
on the historically reliable. Heritage is not an objective fact about the
world but a social construction.20 8
A. The Core Concept ofHeritage
To solve the difficult problems of subjectivity and definition
embedded within the subjective concept of heritage, we must first focus
on the core concept of cultural heritage. 2 0 9  Aldo Leopold laid the
foundation for the modem environmental movement by sketching out the
essential principles of environmentalism: first, the interconnectedness of
people and their physical environment, and second, the importance of the
unique characteristics of each object.210 This article defines heritage in a
similar way, first by examining the connection between people and
204. Id. at 65.
205. Id.
206. As Derek Gillman points out, "we are what we are, because we were what we
were." DEREK GILLMAN, THE IDEA OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 52 (2d. ed., Cambridge
University Press 2010) (2006).
207. Lowenthal, supra note 201, at 127.
208. Gillman, supra note 206, at 44.
209. Last, supra note 191, at 59.
210. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1986). Lynda L. Butler, The
Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within Nature's Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
927, 943-52, 981-86 (1990); Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal
Property Theory, 20 VT. L. REv. 299, 301, 309, 350 (1995).
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physical and intangible elements, and second the passing of these
elements and connections from generation to generation.
This bestowing of ideas and objects creates a different kind of value
which property law is badly equipped to order. As Christopher Byrne
argues, "there is a fundamental difference between goods that are
standardized and easily replaced, and those that are vested with
emotional, spiritual, or cultural qualities"; heritage ideas and objects
"retain unique and transcendent cultural significance which imparts
inherent value to them." 2 1 1 This value must be tied to "human
experience," because as Sarah Harding argues, "[t]he suggestion that
a ... [Leonardo da Vinci] manuscript has value independent of human
valuing or human experience is incoherent; cultural heritage is valuable
precisely because it is an expression or an intimate part of human
experience."2 12 Much like "an art theorist would probably not attempt to
define 'art' solely in terms of a physical objects hypothesis. . . . The
same can be said of 'cultural heritage.1. 3 It is this connection to the
human experience which must be the core around which heritage can be
meaningfully defined.214 We must look beyond the physical description
of objects to their connection with people.215 In some cultures, certain
objects lose their value without these associations; "the sacredness of the
ritual is violated if the objects are misused."2 16
Gael Graham has noted that international law in recent decades has
focused on the idea of regulating "a common cultural heritage." 217
Harding proposes that cultural heritage is "anything that is of some
cultural importance." 218 Lyndel Prott has argued that heritage "implies
something cherished which is to be handed on to succeeding
generations." 219  As a consequence, the use of the term "cultural
property" has been criticized. Property "has acquired a wide range of
211. Christopher S. Byrne, Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and NAGPRA: Have We
Finally Recognized Communal Property Rights in Cultural Objects, 8 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 109, 118 (1993).
212. Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 291,
317 (1999).
213. Gregory Tolhurst, A Comment on the Return of Indigenous Artefacts, 3 J. ART,
ANTIQUITY& L. 15, 23 (1998).
214. Flessas, supra note 136, at 1070-71.
215. Blake, supra note 3, at 84.
216. Harding, supra note 212, at 312; Moustakas, supra note 190, at 1195 ("What
some groups see as a cultural artifact, other groups see as a living thing which enables
them to achieve confidence in themselves and, thus, able to imagine their future.").
217. Gael M. Graham, Protection and Reversion of Cultural Property: Issues of
Definition and Justification, 21 INT'L LAw. 755, 755-56 (1987).
218. Harding, supra note 212, at 297.
219. Prott, supra note 2, at 226.
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emotive and value-laden nuances." 220 Karen Warren has argued that
"[b]y conceiving the dispute over cultural heritage issues as a dispute
over properties, and by focusing the debate over cultural properties on
the question of rights and rules governing ownership ... the dominant
perspective keeps in place a value-hierarchical, dualistic, rights/rules
ethical framework for identifying what counts as a worthwhile value or
claim, for assessing competing claims, and for resolving the conflicts
among competing claims." 22 1 That nicely highlights the fatal flaws of
property with respect to certain claims. Disputes involving cultural
objects bring to bear "cross-cultural claims that cannot be addressed
solely by reference to values that have traditionally been embedded
within the legal commentaries on property." 222  Cultural property
connotes control in the form of property rights. Yet "this way of
delineating an individual or group's relationship to a thing may be quite
alien in other societies."223 This has led some to argue that cultural
objects which carry deep connections with a community should be
inalienable. 224  Joseph Sax has argued "the fate of some objects is
momentous for the community at large."225 In addition, some cultures
value different kinds of connections between people and objects. For
example, the English Court of Appeal has held that an Indian temple idol
can be accorded legal personality in Indian law to enable the temple to
seek its return.226
This connection to a culture forms an important core concept in
defining the concept of heritage. Use of the term "culture" has been
criticized as well. There exists a disconnect between the way legal
systems envision property and culture. In some cases, the idea of
property can dominate culture. Roger Mastalir argues "[c]ultural
property stripped of cultural significance would be merely property,
more or less beautiful or rare and more or less valuable on the basis of
that beauty or rarity only." 227 Patty Gerstenblith has argued that "'culture
describes the relationship between a group and the objects it holds
220. Prott and O'Keefe, supra note 4, at 309.
221. KAREN WARREN, REINVENTING THE MUSEUM: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PARADIGM SHIFT 303, 315 (Gail Anderson ed., 2004).
222. Flessas, supra note 136, at 1068 n.3.
223. Prott and O'Keefe, supra note 4, at 310.
224. Moustakas, supra note 190, at 1184 (arguing "[t]he nexus between a cultural
object and a group is the essential measurement for determining whether group rights in
cultural property will be effectuated to the fullest extent possible-by holding such
objects strictly inalienable from the group").
225. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 4 (2001).
226. Bumper Dev. Corp. v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis, [1991] 1 WLR 1362.
227. Roger W Mastalir, Proposal for Protecting the Cultural and Property Aspects of
Cultural Property under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1033, 1039 (1992).
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important. The concept of 'property' in its traditional sense of focusing
on legal rights of individuals to possession of objects is foreign to this
notion." 2 28  For example, we can think about how individual
empowerment allows for heritage preservation. 22 9 Local knowledge and
appreciation is integral to this process. Local knowledge and
participation can be an important aspect of the zoning process, yet the
law often ignores this knowledge. 23 0  Scholars have long argued that
individual residents need to pay attention to the planning decisions of
their own cities and to think about what makes a city successful. 231
Heritage rights and objects suffer from insufficient judicial recognition,
prompting some commentators to argue for an expansion of property to
encompass some of the characteristics of property.23 2 But this expansion
only serves to dilute and make incomprehensible the ideas of heritage
and property, which at their core are competing concepts.233 Heritage
rights and restrictions are recognized in some cases. Owners of property
that might be subject to protection and restriction to preserve historic
234
character may be expected to anticipate these restrictions.
Conservation land trusts have been used to fill the gaps in environmental
law. 235
B. Levels ofHeritage
We can look at cultural heritage on a number of levels. There are
instances where objects and classes of objects can be tethered to an
individual, to communities, or even to smaller groups which transcend
modem borders. Take for instance the national recognition of Native
American heritage.
228. Gerstenblith, supra note 127, at 567.
229. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) (arguing that grass-roots
efforts to promote environmental justice are more likely to produce results than a legal-
scientific approach).
230. Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75
IOWA L. REV. 1057 (1990).
231. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1965).
232. Arnold, supra note 13, at 307 (arguing that, historically, judicial recognition of
land has allowed an owner of real property to receive just compensation when
government regulation prohibits economic use, but not when the the regulation permitted
economic use).
233. Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, supra note 109, at 1025.
234. See Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Dist. of Columbia, 23 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38
(D.D.C. 1998), aff'd, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
235. Mary Christina Wood & Matthew O'Brien, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part II):
Evaluating Four Models of Tribal Participation in the Conservation Trust Movement, 27
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 477, 536-38 (2008).
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Traditionally, the federal government has failed to protect Native
American lands.236 In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians the
Supreme Court awarded $17.1 million plus interest-for a total of $122.5
million-for the wrongful taking of the Black Hills. 23 7  The Lakota
people rejected the ruling, and the money currently sits in an interest-
bearing account. Instead, they want the return of the Black Hills itself.2 38
Alexandra New Holy has argued that:
[t]he strength of the Lakota in defining themselves as Lakota in
relationship to a lived physical, social, and spiritual relationship with
Paha Sapa [the Lakota name for the Black Hills], as defined by
treaties, can be demonstrated by their refusal to accept monetary
compensation without a return of Black Hills lands. In order to know
who they are, they must remember and uphold their spiritual
covenant with Paha Sapa.239
This lack of recognition for Native American heritage continues in other
forms. Nell Jessup Newton has argued that "the fifth amendment takings
clause affords less protection for Indian land than for other land."240
Yet the federal government, applying a heritage framework, has
begun to correct its relationship with Native American Groups. The
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 241
stands as a model heritage law framework which has allowed
cooperation and dialogue between Native Americans and the federal
government. It addresses the theft and destruction of Native American
cultural objects and remains by fostering relationships between the
federal government, museums, archaeologists, and Native Americans.242
It vests control of Native American human remains and objects from
federal or tribal lands with the tribes. It requires federally funded
institutions to inventory Native American human remains and other
objects and allows for repatriation of objects.243
236. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 85-
86 (1985).
237. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24 (1980).
238. John P. La Velle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by
Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux
Nation, 5 GREAT PLAINs NAT. RESOURCES J. 40, 42 (2001).
239. Alexandra New Holy, The Heart of Everything That Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties,
and Lakota Identity, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 317, 352 (1998).
240. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 255 (1984).
241. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a) (2000).
242. 136 Cong. Rec. S17174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
243. NAGPRA does have limits, including little "complete control over cultural
symbols" for example. Brown, supra note 156, at 587.
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Carpenter et al. point out that property law allowed for the return of
Inuit remains which had been mounted and displayed at the American
244Museum of Natural History. Yet they offer no justification for
classifying NAGPRA as a property-based remedy. In fact, NAGPRA
should properly be considered "heritage law," because it respects and
accommodates the web of interests engendered by a piece of material
heritage. After all, NAGPRA has not been challenged by Takings
Clause claims because museums could never have acquired good title to
human remains or grave objects. These objects are inalienable pieces of
indigenous heritage. Section 3001(13) of NAGPRA states the Act does
not violate the Takings Clause because museums will not have given up
lawfully held property. Patty Gerstenblith has noted that "human
remains and funerary objects are not subject to private ownership ...
provisions dealing with unassociated burial objects, sacred objects and
objects of cultural patrimony are also carefully drafted so that they apply
only to objects that were owned communally by a Native American tribe
or Native Hawaiian organization." 24 5 Similar provisions can be found
elsewhere in the law,
In the United States, the heir or next of kin has traditionally not had a
property right in the dead body but rather a right in the nature of a
custodian to hold and protect the body until burial, to determine its
disposition, to select the place and manner of burial and, in the case
of expressed wishes stated in a will, the executor has the duty of
complying with the deceased's wishes pertaining to manner of
disposition of remains.246
The drafters of NAGPRA were careful to use some property terms,
but also carefully avoided them in other circumstances. For example, in
the case of the excavation of remains or cultural objects found on tribal
or federal lands, those objects are regulated via either "ownership or
control."2 47  Also, federal agencies or museums with "possession or
248control" over Native American objects must compile an inventory.
Yet, the repatriation provisions for human remains avoid use of
244. Carpenter, Katyal, & Riley, supra note 109, at 1030-31 (citing KENN HARPER,
GIVE ME MY FATHER'S BODY: THE LIFE OF MINIK, THE NEW YORK ESKIMO 24-25 (2001)).
245. Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and
the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
409, 435 (2003).
246. Cohan, John Alan, An Examination ofArcheological Ethics and the Repatriation
Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part One), 27 ENVIRONs ENvTL L. & POL'Y J.
349, 402-03 (2003).
247. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2006).
248. Id. § 3003(a).
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"ownership or title." 249 American law treats these remains as heritage-
they cannot be owned.250
NAGPRA has criminal prohibitions, and defendants have attempted
to challenge convictions under NAGPRA based on a traditional property-
based constitutional principles. Yet courts have recognized that
NAGPRA protects objects of Native American heritage, not property.
For example, in United States v. Corrow, the defendant challenged his
indictment for selling Navajo ceremonial masks, a prohibited act under
NAGPRA. 2 5' During the federal district court trial, Corrow claimed the
statute was unconstitutionally vague, because the terms "cultural items"
and "cultural patrimony" were not sufficient to provide him fair notice
252that he was violating its provisions. The Federal district court
disagreed. The void for vagueness analysis looks at the defendant's
particular conduct, and Corrow had knowledge of Navajo culture and
traditions.2 53 He knew that the buying and selling of bird feathers was
probably illegal.254 The defendant also argued the criminal provision
would lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, because law
enforcement officers would be unable to determine which objects might
fit under the statutory definitions. 2 55 The court dismissed this argument,
as testimony of a United States Department of the National Park Service
employee stated that law enforcement personnel frequently consult with
tribes to determine if an object may be contested.25 6 Corrow raised the
same issue on appeal.257 He relied on conflicting Navajo testimony
regarding the importance of the ceremonial masks at issue.258 However,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his argument. He had "fair
notice" that the masks "could not be bought and sold absent criminal
consequences."2 59 Once again, the court analyzed the specific conduct of
the defendant. The void for vagueness analysis requires that a statute
"convey to those individuals within its purview what it purports to
prohibit and how it will punish an infraction." 2 60 Here, the defendant had
frequently bought and sold Native American objects, and was on notice
that his behaviour was criminal, even if he was not aware of the specific
249. Id. § 3005(a)(1).
250. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.10 (2005).
251. United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553, 1564-67 (D. N. Mex. 1996).
252. Id. at 1559.
253. Id. at 1561-62.
254. Id. at 1565.
255. Id. at 1559.
256. Id. at 1564-67.
257. United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799 (10th Cir. 1997).
258. Id. at 801.
259. Id. at 804.
260. Id. at 802.
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provision under NAGPRA which may have been applicable.2 6 ' And
though he did not make this argument in his appeal, the defendant had a
very different conception of how these objects and practices should be
used. The law precludes the commodification of ceremonial masks, and
as a result his conviction was upheld.
Likewise, in United States v. Tidwell, the defendant appealed his
conviction for trafficking in objects in violation of NAGPRA. * Tidwell
argued that the vagueness of the cultural patrimony definition rendered
the statute unconstitutionally vague.2 63 As the terms used by NAGPRA
were established by oral history, "it was impossible for him to have fair
notice of his wrongful conduct." 264 The court did not look with favour
on Tidwell's argument. His background knowledge as a dealer in Native
American Art put him on notice of NAGPRA's prohibitions.26 5
NAGPRA presents some complicated dilemmas. When members of
a Hopi tribe announced they would use repatriated religious objects in
daily ceremonies, it produced "a disheartening prospect for curators who
dedicate their working lives to such objects' conservation."26 6 Steven
Vincent summarizes the major critique of NAGPRA, "[i]t is the
affirmation of group-or tribal-rights over the imperatives of science
and the free transmission of knowledge that outrages so many critics of
NAGPRA." 2 67 Also, Naomi Mezey argues that repatriated objects will
prevent further creativity by limiting the "authentic" ways one may
express her identity.2 6 8 Cultural property laws will also render "cultural
stuff off limits to outsiders" and will mean that "Indian stuff belongs to
Indians." 269 She argues NAGPRA is a "radical" law which "obscures
cultural movement, hybridity, fusion, and the potential for competing
claims to cultural objects . . . [and] also dissuades imitation, discussion,
and critique between groups by making a group's cultural stuff off limits
to outsiders." 270 These are hard questions, and there will be winners and
losers when important cultural values conflict. Yet NAGPRA offers a
model of how the law can value and respect heritage, which may mean
sacrificing property principles in some cases. There are other examples
261. Id. at 804.
262. United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976, 978-79 (10th Cir. 1999).
263. Id. at 979.
264. Id. at 980.
265. Id.
266. Brown, supra note 154, at 17.
267. Steven Vincent, Indian Givers, in WHo OWNS THE PAST 33, 39 (Kate Fitz Gibbon
ed., 2005).
268. Mezey, supra note 161, at 2017.
269. Id. at 2018.
270. Id.
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of changes which have been dictated by the inability of property law to
accommodate heritage.
The Watts Towers in Los Angeles are a series of towers and
structures. Simon Rodia was an Italian immigrant and construction
worker who had moved to Watts in 1921; he built the towers around his
home for the next 34 years using found objects. 271 His raw materials
were objects such as shells, tiles, bottles, pipes, bits of plates and just
about anything else which struck his eye.272 The towers may be "one of
the most powerful works of 20th-century American art, yet because of
their location and their humble creator they "have been in a perpetual
state of crisis for more than half a century."27 3 A reporter visiting the
towers in 1965 described them:
[a] scalloped wall that is completely covered with mosaic runs along
the street, and from outside it half a dozen spires are visible. Inside
it, on the triangular piece of ground that was formerly Rodia's yard, a
visitor can see three large towers, four smaller towers, two or three
fountains, some bird-baths and decorated pathways, a model of a
ship, and an openwork gazebo. 274
These towers, created by one untrained laborer with a vision have taken
on new meaning, and have helped to build community and challenge
common perceptions of the Watts area of Los Angeles. 2 7 5 Attempts to
tear down the structure provided the spark which led California to enact
its own moral rights rules. 2 76 This moral rights framework for artists
views works of art not as mere goods, but values the intent of the artist
which can follow the work after an artist has sold or created their work.
It recognizes the heritage embedded in certain classes of art, and fosters
protection and the bestowing of that work on future generations.
Yet heritage may be called upon in other circumstances as well. On
December 19, 2007, Alex Salmond, Scotland's First Minister, stated "I
find it utterly unacceptable that the Lewis Chessmen are scattered
around. ... And you can be assured that I will continue campaigning for
271. Hector Tobar, Watts Towers-World's Treasure, L.A.'s Secret, L.A. TIMES,
May 28, 2010, at A2, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-tobar-
20100528,0,4696688,full.column.
272. LEON WHITESON, THE WATTS TOWERS 23 (Mosaic Press 1990) (1989).
273. Christopher Knight, The Watts Towers'Perpetual State of Crisis, May 28, 2010,
L.A. TIMES CULTURE MONSTER (2010), http://latimesbIogs.Iatimes.com/culturemonster/
2010/05/the-watts-towers-perpetual-state-of-crisis.html (last visited June 16, 2010).
274. Calvin Trillin, I Know I Want to Do Something, NEW YORKER, May 29, 1965, at
72.
275. Whiteson, supra note 272, at 30-31, 40.
276. Sax, supra note 225, at 23-24.
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a united set of Lewis Chessmen in an independent Scotland."2 7 7 This
statement is sure to gain support among those Scots who feel England
has been harassing and plundering Scotland for centuries. The claim for
the removal of all the chessmen to Scotland was surely intended to
strengthen the notion of an independent and historically separate
Scotland. Yet it stands as a good example of the kind of irresponsible
and base nationalistic claim that does a disservice to legitimate
repatriation claims. The Lewis chessmen are a medieval collection of 93
pieces forming four or five complete sets. 278 They were most likely
carved in Norway in the 12th century, and then were likely taken by a
merchant on their way to nobles in Ireland.279 Salmond's policy has
some troubling consequences for Scotland's museums. Its collections
are packed with objects taken home by Scots during the colonial era, and
many of these objects were hardly taken in a properly bargained for
exchange. These institutions would surely have to quickly dispose of
much of their collection. In fact, the chessmen were legally acquired,
and there is absolutely nothing to suggest they were wrongfully acquired.
If we were to return these objects to their homeland where they were
created, they would not return to the Outer Hebrides, but rather to
Norway. This conflict and discussion of cultural property often
manifests itself in the choice of terminology. The idea of property has a
long history, with a great deal of important legal and philosophical
underpinnings. Heritage has not been accorded the same rich history,
however. Yet applying the legal concepts of property causes difficulties
when applied to cultural heritage when rules guiding the protection of
current possessors, the concept of "ownership," and the dangers of over-
propertization and commoditization.2 80
Choosing to apply either a heritage or property framework may
betray certain normative preferences.
277. Ian Jack, Our Chessmen Were Taken, but Scotland Is Heaving with Stolen Art,
THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 12, 2008, at 36, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment
isfree/2008/jan/12/britishidentity.uk. Jack argues:
It would be easy to accuse Salmond of nothing more than opportunism, adding
to his reputation for that streak. In fact, he has been sporadically campaigning
for the return of the Lewis Chessmen for 10 years. My explanation is that his
demand comes out of a previous era of nationalism that was quite blind to
Scotland's history as England's imperial partner-needed to be blind to it,
because in terms of wealth it was Scotland's golden age and inconvenient to
anti-English grievance. I had thought that the grievance mode was passing.
But not yet, not yet.
Id.
278. Neil Stratford, THE LEWIS CHESSMEN AND THE ENIGMA OF THE HOARD, (British
Museum Press) (1997).
279. Id.
280. Prott and O'Keefe, supra note 4, at 309-12.
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C. Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage
A number of writers have examined the differences between ideas
of "cultural property" and "cultural heritage." 281  There has been little
consensus for the precise boundaries of both concepts.282 Authors will
often use the terms property and heritage interchangeably.283 Cultural
heritage connotes an idea of permanence. As Janet Blake notes, it is a
"form of inheritance to be kept in safekeeping and handed down to future
generations."2 84 Cultural property has a limited scope as it can prove
"inadequate and inappropriate for the range of matters covered by the
concept of the cultural heritage." 285 Cultural property has been described
as a "sub-set," 28 6 a larger collection of cultural heritage which is "capable
of encompassing this [within its] much broader range of possible
elements, including the intangibles."287 Language can also present a
difficult problem, "Rather than a mere shortcoming arising from different
language versions conveying the same concept, this becomes a more
substantive matter . .. cultural property is commonly translated into
terms such as 'biens culturels,' 'beni culturali,' 'bienes culturales,'
'Kulturgut,' and 'bens culturais."' These terms have "significantly
different legal meaning in the relevant domestic legal systems."28 8
Lowenthal argues that cultural heritage law suffers because it is stretched
too thin: "Too much is asked of heritage. In the same breath we
commend national patrimony, regional and ethnic legacies, and a global
heritage shared and sheltered in common. We forget that these aims are
usually incompatible." 28 9  Gregory Tolhurst argues that cultural
properties are physical objects, and cultural heritage are the intangible
expressions of culture.29 0
281. See Prott and O'Keefe, supra note 4; Roger O'Keefe, The Meaning of 'Cultural
Property' Under the 1954 Hague Convention, 46 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 26 (1999);
Blake supra note 3; Flessas, supra note 136; Frigo, supra note 179.
282. Blake, supra note 3, at 66.
283. Etienne Clement, Some Recent Practical Experience in the Implementation of
the 1954 Hague Convention, 3 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 11 (2007).
284. Blake, supra note 3, at 83.
285. Prott and O'Keefe, supra note 4, at 319.
286. Frigo, supra note 179, at 369.
287. Blake, supra note 3, at 67.
288. Frigo, supra note 179, at 370.
289. Lowenthal, supra note 201, at 227.
290. Tolhurst, supra note 213, at 24. He argues:
Cultural heritage arguably concerns itself with those attributes of culture that
are intangible, such as certain ideas, practices or behaviour. These are the
things that are of real benefit to the human race and which help advance the
human race. Moreover it is these matters that the human race generally can
claim an interest in. Not everyone would define 'cultural heritage' in that way,
many definitions would include not only the intangible but also the tangible.
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To allay this tension, we can examine the concepts of cultural
heritage and cultural property in international instruments. The first use
of the term "cultural property" came in the 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.2 9 1
This was followed in 1970 by the UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property.292 Similar language is also found in the
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, of 26 March 1999.293
Also using the term is the European Convention on Offences Relating to
294Cultural Property. However, there are other international conventions
which apply other terms. The Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects replaces "property" with "objects."2 95 Many
commentators, however, were still using term "cultural property" when
referencing it. 296
Yet other instruments refer to heritage. The 1992 European
Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, which
replaced a 1969 version with the same name,297 and the 1985 Convention
Id.
291. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter the Hague Convention].
292. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
293. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 [hereinafter
Hague Cultural Property Protocol II].
294. European Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural Property, June 23, 1985,
25 1.L.M. 44.
295. UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Convention].
296. Frigo, supra note 179, at 368 (citations omitted).
297. European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage
(Revised), Jan. 16, 1992, 1966 U.N.T.S. 305. Article 1 defines "archaeological heritage:"
The aim of this (revised) Convention is to protect the archaeological heritage as
a source of the European collective memory and as an instrument for historical
and scientific study.
To this end shall be considered to be elements of the archaeological heritage all
remains and objects and any other traces of mankind from past epochs:
the preservation and study of which help to retrace the history of mankind
and its relation with the natural environment;
for which excavations or discoveries and other methods of research into
mankind and the related environment are the main sources of information;
and
which are located in any area within the jurisdiction of the Parties.
The archaeological heritage shall include structures, constructions, groups of
buildings, developed sites, moveable objects, monuments of other kinds as well
as their context, whether situated on land or under water.
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for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe,298 are two
examples. UNESCO also supported the 1972 Convention concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage soon after the
earlier 1970 instrument.299  And more recently, the 2001 UNESCO
Convention for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage,300 the
2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage,o' and the 2003 UNESCO Declaration Concerning the
Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage 302 all focus on heritage.
These international instruments all combine to "[reflect] both the
growing concern in environmentalist issues in its integration of the
cultural with the natural heritage as well as the concept of a 'common
Id
298. Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, Oct. 3,
1985, 1496 U.N.T.S. 147, 25 1.L.M. 380. Article I of the Convention defines
"architectural heritage:"
1. Monuments: all buildings and structures of conspicuous historical,
archaeological, artistic, scientific, social or technical interest, including their
fixtures and fittings;
2. Groups of buildings: homogeneous groups of urban or rural buildings
conspicuous for their historical, archaeological, artistic, scientific, social or
technical interest which are sufficiently coherent to form topographically
definable units;
3. Sites: the combined works of man and nature, being areas which are partially
built upon and sufficiently distinctive and homogeneous to be topographically
definable and are of conspicuous historical, archaeological, artistic, scientific,
social or technical interest.
Id. at 381.
299. UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37. Article I defines "cultural heritage:"
Monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting,
elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings
and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the
point of view of history, art or science;
Groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because
of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of
outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
Sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and of man, and areas
including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from
the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view.
Id.
300. Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2, 2001, 41
1.L.M. 40.
301. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17,
2003, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf
[hereinafter Intangible Convention].
302. UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural
Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURLID=17718
&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html.
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heritage of mankind' which had been developing at this time in relation
to seabed mineral resources."3 03
Many have strongly criticized the efforts of indigenous groups to
assert property rights over their traditional cultural resources, arguing
that culture should be free from restrictions, and should be seen as a
commons. Naomi Mezey argues that "the idea of property has so
colonized the idea of culture that there is not much culture left in cultural
property." 304  If indigenous peoples and culture-creators everywhere
resort to over-propertization, than we risk the exclusion of future
generations of culture-creators who rely on what has come before to
promote the free flow of cultural expression and foster creativity.
Rosemary Coombe has argued indigenous traditional knowledge must be
protected because "most of the worlds' poorest people depend upon their
traditional environmental, agricultural, and medicinal knowledge for
their continuing survival, given their marginalization from market
economies and the inability of markets to meet their basic needs of social
reproduction."305
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA) 306 attempts to protect
authentic Native American products. The legislative history highlights
the magnitude of the problem as "counterfeit Indian products were
responsible for an annual loss ranging from forty to eighty million
dollars per year from the Indian arts and crafts industry in the United
States."307 The IACA does not treat the objects themselves as heritage,
but rather respects and promotes traditional arts and crafts, allowing this
process to be treated as heritage so that present and future generations
can continue to market and sell these objects. Some have argued that it
hampers Native American identity by restricting too many objects.3 08
There are a number of ways in which heritage can be created. There
are a number of reasons for the creation and the cultivation of heritage.
Groups may wish to foster a sense of pride in the community or nation,
or there may be a desire to attract tourists and travelers, or simply to add
prestige. In some cases nations may seek all of these. In Mongolia, the
303. Blake, supra note 3, at 62.
304. Mezey, supra note 161,at 2005.
305. Rosemary J. Coombe, Protecting Traditional Environmental Knowledge and
New Social Movements in the Americas: Intellectual Property, Human Right, or Claims
to an Alternative Form of Sustainable Development, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 115, 115 (2005).
306. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, ch. 748, 49 Stat. 891 (current version at 25
U.S.C. §§ 305, 305a, 305b, 305c, 305d and 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (2010); Indian Arts and
Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 305, 305d, 305e (2010)).
307. Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation
and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 299, 339 (2002).
308. William J. Hapiuk, Jr., OfKitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian
Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1009 (2001).
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Genco Tour Bureau has spent seven million dollars to create the
Chinggis Khaan Statue Complex to honor the famous Mongol Genghis
Khan.30 9 Heritage can be destroyed and erased as well in order to
remove the material culture of a group. The world witnessed again the
destructive force of iconoclasm in 2001 when the Taliban destroyed the
Bamiyan Buddhas and removing pre-Islamic culture from all over
Afghanistan.3 10
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This piece has offered a definition of heritage as the physical and
intangible elements associated with a group of individuals which are
created and passed from generation to generation. This definition allows
us to distinguish heritage from other traditional notions of property. The
two concepts of heritage and property should be properly distinguished
in legal discourse. Heritage law now governs a wide range of activities,
some of which include preventing destruction of works of art, preventing
the theft of art and antiquities, preventing the illegal excavation of
antiquities, preventing the mutilation and destruction of ancient
structures and sites, creating a means for preserving sites and
monuments, and even righting past wrongs. This piece will hopefully
encourage other scholars to engage in an ongoing dialogue about heritage
and its preservation. Competing notions of heritage and property may
prevent resolutions to some disputes, and cause the conflation of the
ideas of property and heritage. Yet a richer understanding of heritage
will allow us to properly weigh the interests of future generations and
evaluate the obligations imposed on us by our forebears.
309. Bill Donahue, Flogging Genghis Khan, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2010,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/flogging-genghis-khan/8182 (last
visited Aug 23, 2010).
310. Gillman, supra note 206, at 9-12.
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